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 I. INTRODUCTION 
The Teacher Effectiveness and Accountability for the Children 
of New Jersey Act (“TEACHNJ” or “the Act”) has never been about 
New Jersey’s students.1  But its proponents in Trenton have always 
made sure to discuss the Act as if it were.  Nonetheless, the Act 
focuses its attention squarely on teachers.  Without any particular 
rationale, the Act makes it more difficult for teachers to attain 
tenure, and much easier to scrutinize and to fire teachers once they 
have tenure.  However, the Act’s scheme for achieving its actual goals 
lacks effective evaluation procedures and runs afoul of well-
established due process rights.  In short, the TEACHNJ Act does not 
do what it says it does, is not particularly good at what it actually 
does, and is without adequate procedural safeguards. 
On May 23, 2011, State Senator Teresa Ruiz, a Democrat from 
Essex County, told The Star Ledger that she would introduce the 
TEACHNJ Act later that week.2  In its original form, Senator Ruiz’s 
bill effectively ended tenure in New Jersey.3  The bill eliminated all 
due process for tenure removal.4  It authorized local principals to 
revoke a teacher’s tenure after two years of ineffective ratings if the 
principal felt that the teacher was not following an individualized 
 
 1  Although the stated goal of the TEACHNJ Act is to “raise student achievement 
by improving instruction,” the statute’s focus is the employment conditions of 
teachers, including its main goal of tenure reform.  Guide to the TEACHNJ Act, NEW 
JERSEY DEP’T OF EDU., http://www.nj.gov/education/AchieveNJ/intro/TeachNJGuide.pdf 
(last updated June 2014).  The New Jersey Department of Education stated that:  
At its core, TEACHNJ reforms the processes of earning and maintaining 
tenure by improving evaluations and opportunities for professional 
growth.  Specifically: 
• Tenure decisions are now based on multiple measures of 
student achievement and teacher practice as measured 
by new evaluation procedures. 
• Lengthy and costly tenure hearings are shorter, focused 
on process only, and less expensive. 
• Educator feedback and development is more 
individualized and focused on students.  
Id.  See also Jarrett Renshaw, Gov. Christie Signs Teacher Tenure Overhaul Bill, THE STAR 
LEDGER (Aug. 2, 2012), http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2012/08/gov_christie_ 
signs_teacher_ten.html (quoting State Senate President Stephen Sweeney as saying “We 
can’t have the bad ones in schools anymore.  One bad teacher is one bad teacher too 
many.”).  
 2  Jessica Calefati, State Sen. Teresa Ruiz Pushes New Teacher Tenure Reform, THE STAR 
LEDGER (May 23, 2011), http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2011/05/nj_democrat_ 
pushes_new_tenure.html. 
 3  See Teacher Effectiveness and Accountability for the Children of New Jersey 
(TEACHNJ) Act, S. 2925, 214th Leg. (2011), available at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us 
/2010/Bills/S3000/2925_I1.PDF [hereinafter Sen. Ruiz TEACHNJ Proposal].  
 4  Id. 
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improvement plan.5  The bill also included a longer probationary 
period for teachers prior to tenure, a teacher evaluation tool based 
on student test scores, a two-tier teacher rating system of effective 
and ineffective, and a professional development piece as well.6  
Despite the bill’s evident focus on firing teachers, Senator Ruiz told 
The Star Ledger, “I approached this bill through the lens of 
supporting and elevating the profession, but most importantly with 
a vision of the children whose futures are at stake.”7 
Senator Ruiz was not alone in her zeal to upend the teaching 
profession.  This incarnation of the TEACHNJ Act came fast on the 
heels of separate, similar education reform legislation introduced by 
Republican State Senator Joe Kyrillos and supported by Republican 
Governor Chris Christie.8  Senator Kyrillos’ bill differed mainly from 
Senator Ruiz’s bill in its lack of professional development for 
teachers.9  Prior to Senator Kyrillos’ bill, the governor himself had 
proposed teacher reforms mandating merit pay and ending last-in, 
first-out job protections.10  Echoing Senator Ruiz, a spokesman for 
Senate Republicans invoked the children: “Reforming tenure is 
absolutely essential to making sure every student is being taught by 
an effective educator.”11  This rhetoric and the accompanying wave 
of legislative proposals suggest that New Jersey’s children were in 
dire straits. 
Yet, New Jersey’s children were quite well educated at the 
time.12  According to the National Center for Education Statistics 
 
 5  Id. 
 6  Id. 
 7  Calefati, supra note 2.  
 8  Id. 
 9  Compare Sen. Ruiz TEACHNJ Proposal with School Children First Act, S. 2925, 
214th Leg. (2011) (sponsored by Sen. Joseph M. Kyrillos, Jr.), available at 
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2010/Bills/S3000/ 2881_I1.PDF. 
 10  See Matt Bai, How Chris Christie Did His Homework, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/ 2011/02/27/magazine/27christie-t.html?_r=0.  The profile 
noted: 
The war between Christie and the union has two fronts, so closely 
interrelated that it’s hard to separate them.  First there’s the fight over 
budgeting issues like pensions and benefits.  And then there’s the “year 
of education reform,” as Christie has proclaimed 2011, in which he 
intends to push his case for merit pay, charter schools and the abolition 
of teacher tenure — all of which are, of course, anathema to the union.  
Id.  
 11  Calefati, supra note 2.  
 12  New Jersey State Profile, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, 
http://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/states/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2015).  In 2013, New 
Jersey fourth, eighth, and twelfth graders scored higher than the national average on 
both Math and Reading standardized tests.  Id. 
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(“NCES”), in 2011, the year TEACHNJ was first introduced, New 
Jersey’s fourth graders ranked fourth and second in the nation in 
mathematics and reading, respectively.13  Eighth graders ranked 
third and second in those subjects.14  In 2010, the New Jersey 
Education Association (“NJEA”) noted, and Politifact confirmed, 
that New Jersey’s public high school students achieved the highest 
average Advanced Placement test score in the entire country.15  
Without regard for this success, the governor and both parties in the 
legislature were clamoring for tenure reform. 
On August 6, 2012, Governor Christie signed the revised 
TEACHNJ Act into law.16  The Act had been passed unanimously in 
both the Senate and the Assembly.17  This version of the bill saw 
input from both the governor and the NJEA.18  Governor Christie 
went so far as to thank the union he had previously referred to as 
thugs for the important role they played in the bill’s success.19  An 
 
 13  Id.  
 14  Id.  The rankings are based on student scores on the National Assessment of 
Educational Progress.  Professor Diane Ravitch described the NAEP scores in the 
following manner: 
[They are] [t]he only test scores that can be used comparatively . . . 
because [NAEP] is a no-stakes test.  No one knows who will take it, no 
one knows what will be on the test, no student takes the full test, and the 
results are not reported for individuals or for schools.  There is no way 
to prepare for NAEP, so there is no test prep.  There are no rewards or 
punishments attached to it, so there is no reason to cheat, to teach to the 
test, or to game the system.  
DIANE RAVITCH, REIGN OF ERROR: THE HOAX OF THE PRIVATIZATION MOVEMENT AND THE 
DANGER TO AMERICA’S PUBLIC SCHOOLS 125 (2013) [hereinafter RAVITCH, REIGN OF ERROR].  
 15  Erin O’Neill, NJEA Claims New Jersey Public School Students Have Best Advanced 
Placement Scores in Nation, POLITIFACT (Sept. 4, 2011), http://www.politifact.com/new-
jersey/statements/2011/sep/04/new-jersey-education-association/njea-claims-new-
jersey-public-school-students-have/ (“The NJEA claims the state’s public school 
students have the best Advanced Placement test scores in the country.  PolitiFact New 
Jersey compared the average AP test scores for students across the nation and found 
New Jersey’s public school students rank first.”). 
 16  Teacher Effectiveness and Accountability for the Children of New Jersey 
(TEACHNJ) Act, S. 1455, 215th Leg. (N.J. 2012). 
 17  Salvador Rizzo, Sweeping N.J. Teacher’s Tenure Bill Passes Legislature, Heads to Gov. 
Christie’s Desk, THE STAR-LEDGER (June 25, 2012, 10:05 PM), 
http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2012/06/sweeping_nj_teachers_tenure_ bi.html. 
 18  Id.; Barbara Keshishian, Testimony Before the Senate Budget and Appropriations 
Committee S-1455 (Jun. 18, 2012) (transcript available at 
http://www.njea.org/news/2012/06/18/testimony%20by%20njea%20president%20b
arbara%20keshishian) (mentioning “extensive discussions over the last several 
months”). 
 19  Renshaw, supra note 1 (“The fact of the matter is nothing gets done without their 
input, support and their help.  I know it’s not everything they wanted to have happen, 
and it wasn’t everything that I wanted to have happen.”).  The public thank you of the 
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NJEA spokesman said, “Everyone agreed that we needed to do 
something.”20  State Senate President Stephen Sweeney, a Democrat 
from Gloucester County, added, “We can’t have the bad ones in 
schools anymore.  One bad teacher is one bad teacher too many.”21  
The national media lauded the bill’s passage as an example of 
Governor Christie’s ability to make tough compromises, even in a 
state where the teachers’ union is quite strong.22  Amidst all the 
praise, then Mayor of Newark Cory Booker and Education 
Commissioner Chris Cerf criticized the bill for not going far enough 
to reduce teachers’ job protections.23  In a statement, Senator Ruiz 
again looked to the children: “By strengthening our professionals, 
we will ensure that our students have the best teachers in the 
classroom so that all children—regardless of their background, their 
ZIP code, or their socio-economic status—will have the 
opportunities they deserve for educational excellence.”24 
Despite Senator Ruiz’s public comments focusing on students, 
and the TEACHNJ Act’s official purpose to “raise student 
achievement by improving instruction through the adoption of 
evaluations that provide specific feedback to educators” and 
 
teachers’ union was much different from 2011 when Governor Christie stated: 
I believe the teachers in New Jersey in the main are wonderful public 
servants that care deeply.  But their union, their union are a group of 
political thugs.  They should have taken the salary freeze.  They didn’t 
and now, you know, we had to lay teachers off.  They chose to continue 
to get their salary increases rather than be part of the shared sacrifice. 
Bradley Blackburn, New Jersey Governor Chris Christie Calls His State’s Teachers Union 
‘Political Thugs,’ ABCNEWS (Apr. 6, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/jersey-
governor-chris-christie-calls-teachers-union-political /story?id=13310446.  
 20  Rizzo, supra note 17. 
 21  Renshaw, supra note 1. 
 22  See John Martin, N.J. Gov. Christie Signs Bipartisan Reform of Nation’s Oldest 
Teacher Tenure Law, CNN’ SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT BLOG (August 7, 2012, 2:41 PM), 
http://schoolsofthought.blogs.cnn.com/2012/08/07/n-j-gov-christie-signs-bipartisan-
reform-of-nations-oldest-teacher-tenure-law/ (“Groups that have traditionally been at 
odds worked together to craft and pass the bill sponsored by both Democratic and 
Republican lawmakers.  Not a single member of New Jersey’s bicameral legislature 
voted against it.”); Kate Zernike, Christie Signs Bill Overhauling Job Guarantees for 
Teachers, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/07/nyregion 
/christie-signs-bill-overhauling-teacher-tenure.html?r=0 (“The new law suggests how 
much the landscape has changed on revising education, and on tenure, long among 
the most contentious issues for teachers’ unions and legislatures.”); Cf. Steve Kornacki, 
What Chris Christie Didn’t Tell You, SALON (Aug. 29, 2012, 7:53 AM), 
http://www.salon.com/2012/08/29/what_chris_christie_didn’t_tell_you/(“Again, 
Christie can claim some credit here for pushing the issue aggressively in the public 
square and making it a priority.”).  
 23  Rizzo, supra note 17; Renshaw, supra note 1. 
 24  Rizzo, supra note 17. 
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“inform personnel decisions,” the legislation’s actual target is 
teacher job protections.25  This Note will critique the TEACHNJ Act’s 
changes in teacher evaluations and tenure proceedings, and provide 
recommendations for solving those issues.  Part II will provide a 
brief history of tenure and teacher evaluation in the United States 
generally, along with an explanation of its creation in New Jersey.  
Additionally, Part II will survey recent legislation affecting these 
topics, including a discussion of Vergara v. California, wherein a 
California trial court declared the state’s tenure laws 
unconstitutional.  Part III will appraise the likelihood that the Act’s 
changes in teacher evaluations will meet the Act’s goals.  Part IV will 
analyze the constitutional issues raised by the new tenure removal 
scheme, along with the Office of Administrative Law’s contrasting 
procedures. 
II. TENURE: PAST, PRESENT, AND NEW JERSEY 
A. Tenure’s Past and Present 
Tenure began as a result of the recognition that civil service 
employees needed protection from the vicissitudes of politics.26  In 
the late nineteenth century, the National Education Association 
(“NEA”) thought of tenure as a means of shielding teachers from 
parents, administrators, and boards of education.27  The topic 
headlined the organization’s first conference, held in Chicago in 
1887.28  By the early twentieth century, the NEA espoused tenure as 
an essential component of all teachers’ contracts.29  In 1946, the 
 
 25  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-118 (West 2014). 
 26  Patricia L. Marshall, Debra V. Baucom & Allison L. Webb, Do You Have Tenure, 
and Do You Really Want It?,  CLEARING HOUSE, May-Jun., 1998, at 302, 302-05. See also 
DANA GOLDSTEIN, THE TEACHER WARS: A HISTORY OF AMERICA’S MOST EMBATTLED 
PROFESSION 230 (2014) [hereinafter GOLDSTEIN, THE TEACHER WARS] (“But the history of 
American public education shows that teachers are uniquely vulnerable to political 
pressures and moral panics that have nothing to do with the quality of their work.”).   
 27  Marshall, Baucom & Webb, supra note 26, at 302; M. J. Stephey, A Brief History 
of Tenure, TIME, Nov. 17, 2008, http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/ 
0,8599,1859505,00.html (“Just as steel and auto workers fought against unsafe 
working conditions and unlivable wages, teachers too demanded protection from 
parents and administrators who would try to dictate lesson plans or exclude 
controversial materials like Huck Finn [sic] from reading lists.”). 
 28  Stephey, supra note 27 (“The start of the tenure movement paralleled similar 
labor struggles during the late 19th century . . . . In 1887, nearly 10,000 teachers from 
across the country met in Chicago for the first-ever conference of the National 
Educator’s Association, now one of the country’s most powerful teachers’ unions.”). 
 29  Marshall, Baucom & Webb, supra note 26, at 302. See also GOLDSTEIN, supra note 
26, at 7:  
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NEA stated a formal position on tenure embracing both the removal 
of incompetent teachers and the retention of skilled ones.30  The 
implementation of tenure continued across the country, firmly 
rooting its protections in most school districts by the late 1960s.31 
In recent years, education reformers have attacked tenure, 
characterizing it as intentionally inefficient.32  They claim that 
tenure shields incompetent teachers.33  They say that it is so difficult 
to remove a teacher that administrators prefer to allow bad teachers 
to continue working, rather than begin the process.34  Reformers 
attack the tenure removal process for expense, saying that even if a 
district begins gathering the information necessary to fire a teacher, 
the costs are prohibitive, often citing numbers as high as 
$450,000.35  The New Jersey Department of Education’s own 
explanatory material on the TEACHNJ Act calls tenure hearings 
lengthy and expensive.36  Since tenure is inefficient, difficult to 
remove, cumbersome, and expensive, the argument goes, it needs to 
be scrapped. 
These arguments have persuaded some state legislatures to 
become skeptical of tenure protections.37  Laws in Alabama, 
 
Yet tenure predates collective bargaining for teachers by over half a 
century.  Administrators granted teachers tenure as early as 1909, before 
unions were legally empowered at the negotiating table to demand this 
right.  During the Progressive Era, both ‘good government’ school 
reformers and then-nascent teachers unions supported tenure, which 
prevented teaching jobs from being used as political patronage and 
allowed teachers to challenge dismissals or demotions, once 
commonplace, based on gender, marital status, pregnancy, religion, 
ethnicity, race, sexual orientation, or political ideology.  Tenure has long 
existed even in southern states where teachers are legally barred from 
collective bargaining. 
Id. (emphasis in original).  
 30  Marshall, Baucom & Webb, supra note 26, at 302. 
 31  Id. 
 32  Steven Brill, The Teachers’ Unions’ Last Stand, N.Y. TIMES (May 17, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/23/magazine/23Race-t.html?pagewanted=all&_ 
r=0; Stephey, supra note 27. 
 33  Brill, supra note 32; Stephey, supra note 27. 
 34  Vergara v. State of California, No. BC484642 2014 WL6478415, at *5 (Cal. App. 
Dep’t Super. Ct. Aug. 27, 2014). 
 35  Stephey, supra note 27; Vergara, 2014 WL6478415, at *5.  It is difficult to find 
credible information supporting this figure.  It is repeated often on various anti-tenure 
advocacy websites and by newspapers on that side of the issue as well.  But aside from 
conclusory statements asserting the claim, the author has not been able to find a single 
disinterested and open accounting of the cost of tenure proceedings. 
 36  N.J DEP’T OF EDUC., GUIDE TO THE TEACHNJ ACT (2014), available at 
http://www.state.nj.us/education/Achieve NJ/intro/TeachNJGuide.pdf.  
 37  Laura McNeal, Total Recall: The Rise and Fall of Teacher Tenure, 30 HOFSTRA LAB. & 
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Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Michigan, and New Hampshire have all 
drastically weakened tenure.38  Generally, these laws alter tenure by 
reducing the amount of process necessary for removal, linking 
significant portions of evaluations to student test scores, and 
increasing probationary periods.39  Florida and Idaho’s laws have 
explicitly eliminated tenure, while Colorado’s law essentially does 
so without acknowledging it.40 
Reformers have not limited their campaign to legislation.  
Students Matter, a pet project of Silicon Valley entrepreneur David 
Welch, uses the courts to advance its agenda.41  Welch’s group 
recruited nine public school children and paid the law firm of 
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher 1.1 million dollars to challenge 
California’s tenure removal process, two-year probationary period, 
and seniority rule.42  The case became Vergara v. California.43  It 
ended with a trial court judge declaring California’s tenure laws 
unconstitutional, and calling on the legislature to fix the situation.44 
 
EMP. L.J. 489, 496 (2013); Vergara, 2014 WL6478415, at *6. 
 38  McNeal, supra note 37, at 496. See ALA. CODE § 16-24C-4 et seq. (2013); S.B. 10-
191, 67th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2010); S.B. 736, 2011 Sess. (Fla. 2011); 
S.B. 1327, 61st Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2012) (The Students Come First Bill was 
repealed by voters on Nov. 6, 2012. See Vol. 13-1 Idaho Admin. Bull. 35 (Jan. 2, 
2013)); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 38.83 et seq. (2013); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 273-A:4 (2010 
& Supp. 2012).  
 39  McNeal, supra note 37, at 496. 
 40  McNeal, supra note 37, at 496, 500. 
 41  Adolfo Guzman-Lopez, The Lawsuit’s Called Vergara, but the Name You Should 
Know is Welch, SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA PUBLIC RADIO (Apr. 25, 2014), 
http://www.scpr.org/blogs/education/2014/04/25/16461/the-lawsuit-s-called-
vergara-but-the-name-you-shou/.  Welch made sure to mention the children when 
discussing his organization, though he declined to discuss the amount of money he 
had poured into it:  
Despite not having a background in public education, [Welch] said he 
had no choice but to take on the issue.  “About four years ago, I got to 
the point where there was [sic] too many children that were being 
harmed in the system,” he said.  “If I had the capability of doing the right 
thing to make life better for someone else or for my society, then I try to 
do it.”  In interviews, Welch wouldn’t say how much money the case has 
cost him.  It’s no doubt been substantial.  Tax records for 2012 show he 
loaned Students Matter nearly 1 million dollars that year alone, half of 
which was spent on public relations.   
Id. See also STUDENTSMATTER, http://studentsmatter.org/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2016). 
 42  Guzman-Lopez, supra note 41; Vergara, 2014 WL6478415, at *2.  
 43  Vergara, 2014 WL6478415, at *1. 
 44  Id. at *7. Regarding a legislative response, Judge Rolf M. Treu stated: 
Under California’s separation of powers framework, it is not the function 
of this Court to dictate or even to advise the legislature as to how to 
replace the Challenged Statutes.  All this Court may do is apply 
constitutional principles of law to the Challenged Statutes as it has done 
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In Vergara, the court found these statutes have a serious and 
negative effect on students’ fundamental right to equal education, 
and they disproportionately affect poor and minority students.45  As 
a result, the court applied strict scrutiny to the statutes, and the two-
year probationary period was struck down for its unfair treatment of 
both students and teachers.46  The court held that the tenure removal 
process was so burdensome in its complexity, length, and cost as to 
be unnecessary.47  Calling the logic of the “last-in, first-out” seniority 
statute “unfathomable,” the court stated that this part of California’s 
tenure statute was unconstitutional as well.48 
United States Secretary of Education Arne Duncan hailed the 
decision, calling it “an opportunity . . . to build a new framework 
for the teaching profession that protects students’ rights to 
educational opportunities while providing teachers the support, 
respect and rewarding careers they deserve.”49  Students Matter is 
considering similar actions in Connecticut, Kansas, Maryland, New 
Mexico, New York, and Oregon.50  As it stands, tenure protections 
 
here, and trust the legislature to fulfill its mandated duty to enact 
legislation on the issues herein discussed that passes constitutional 
muster, thus providing each child in this state with a basically equal 
opportunity to achieve a quality education. 
Id. 
 45  Id. at *4. 
 46  Id. at *5. 
 47  Id. at *6.  
 48  Vergara, 2014 WL6478415, at *6. 
 49  Press Release, U.S. Secretary of Education Arne Duncan, Statement from U.S. 
Secretary of Education Arne Duncan Regarding the Decision in Vergara v. California 
(June 10, 2014), http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/statement-us-secretary-
education-arne-duncan-regarding-decision-vergara-v-california.  Secretary Duncan’s 
discussion of the decision invalidating teacher tenure laws focused on students: 
For students in California and every other state, equal opportunities for 
learning must include the equal opportunity to be taught by a great 
teacher.  The students who brought this lawsuit are, unfortunately, just 
nine out of millions of young people in America who are disadvantaged 
by laws, practices and systems that fail to identify and support our best 
teachers and match them with our neediest students.  Today’s court 
decision is a mandate to fix these problems.  Together, we must work to 
fix public confidence in public education.  My hope is that today’s 
decision moves from the courtroom toward a collaborative process in 
California that is fair, thoughtful, practical and swift.  Every state, every 
school district needs to have that conversation. 
Id. 
 50  Jennifer Medina, Judge Rejects Teacher Tenure for California, N.Y. TIMES, (June 10, 
2014), http:// www.nytimes.com/2014/06/11/us/california-teacher-tenure-laws-ruled-
unconstitutional.html:  
Both sides expect the case to generate more like it in cities and states 
around the country. . . . While the next move is still unclear, [Students 
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are under attack in both legislatures and the courts. 
B. Tenure in New Jersey 
In New Jersey, tenure became the law in 1909.51  As of 2012, 
New Jersey’s tenure law had not changed significantly over the more 
than one hundred years of its existence.52  Teachers earned tenure 
after a probationary period of three years of consecutive, satisfactory 
service in the same school district.53  During the probationary 
period, teachers could be fired without cause, that is, without 
hearings as to the reasonableness of the grounds for their 
dismissals.54  
 
Matter] is considering filing lawsuits in New York, Connecticut, 
Maryland, Oregon, New Mexico, Idaho and Kansas as well as other states 
with powerful unions where legislatures have defeated attempts to 
change tenure laws. 
Id. 
 51  Rizzo, supra note 17. See also GOLDSTEIN, THE TEACHER WARS, supra note 26, at 7 
(“Administrators granted teachers tenure as early as 1909”). 
 52  New Jersey School Boards Association, The New Tenure Law: What Board Members 
Need to Know, 36 SCHOOL BOARD NOTES 4, Aug. 14, 2012 (referring to the TEACHNJ Act 
as “the first substantial reform of teacher tenure laws in over a century.”).  
 53  School Officers and Employees—Improvements—Plans and Specifications, 
2012 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 26 (SENATE 1455) (West). 
 54  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:27-3.2 (West 2014); Donaldson v. Board of Education, 320 
A.2d 857, 861-62 (1974).  In Donaldson, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that a 
non-tenured teacher is entitled to a statement of reasons for dismissal upon request, 
but not a formal hearing.  Justice Jacobs stated: 
The teacher is a professional who has spent years in the course of 
attaining the necessary education and training.  When he is engaged as a 
teacher he is fully aware that he is serving a probationary period and may 
or may not ultimately attain tenure.  If he is not reengaged and tenure is 
thus precluded he is surely interested in knowing why and every human 
consideration along with all thoughts of elemental fairness and justice 
suggest that, when he asks, he be told why . . . . The plaintiff does not 
urge before us that, in addition to a statement of reasons, she was entitled 
to a formal hearing before the board.  For the present purposes, we 
assume that no such hearing was required although we hasten to suggest 
that a timely request for informal appearance before the board should 
ordinarily be granted even though no formal hearing is undertaken. 
Id.  See also E. GORDON GEE & PHILIP T. K. DANIEL, LAW AND PUBLIC EDUCATION: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 390 (4th ed. 2009):  
In fact, the vast majority of employees fall under the ‘at-will doctrine,’ 
meaning that persons can be terminated for good reason, bad reason, or 
no reason.  This was the ruling in the case of Castro v. New York City Bd. 
Of Educ., 777 F.Supp. 1113 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), where a non-tenured 
teacher challenged his non-renewal of contract, claiming a pre-
termination hearing was required.  The court concluded that the teacher 
served ‘at will’ in his non-tenured status and failed to prove that he was 
dismissed for a constitutionally impermissible purpose. 
Id.; Teachers’ Rights: Tenure and Dismissal, FINDLAW (May 12, 2015, 7:14 PM), 
PAXTON_FINAL_FORMAT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/23/2016  11:15 PM 
2016] EVERYONE AGREED ON SOMETHING 393 
Before TEACHNJ was enacted, once teachers earned tenure, 
they were afforded due process before districts could fire them.55  To 
prevail in an attempt to remove a tenured teacher, the district had 
to prove one of four reasons for dismissal: inefficiency, incapacity, 
conduct unbecoming a teaching staff member, or some other just 
cause.56  The procedures were as follows: presentation of charges to 
the local Board of Education (“Board”) by the superintendent, 
certification of charges by the Board, filing of charges with the 
Commissioner of Education (“Commissioner”) by the Board, a 
hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) from the Office 
of Administrative Law (“OAL”), and a final decision on the ALJ’s 
ruling by the Commissioner.57 
C. TEACHNJ’s Changes to Tenure 
The TEACHNJ Act makes significant changes to tenure.  The Act 
increases the probationary period leading up to receiving tenure 
from three years to four.58  Administrators may base up to fifty 
percent of teachers’ evaluations on student test performance.59  This 
rule is satisfied through the creation of student growth objectives 
(“SGOs”) by individual teachers.60  The Act mandates that 
summative evaluations include four ratings: highly effective, 
 
http://education.findlaw.com/teachers-rights/teachers-rights-tenure-and-
dismissal.html:  
Prior to attaining tenure, a probationary teacher may be dismissed at the 
discretion of the school district, subject to contractual and constitutional 
restrictions.  Laws other than those governing tenure will apply to 
determine whether a discharge of a teacher is wrongful.  If a probationary 
teacher’s dismissal does not involve discrimination or does not violate 
terms of the teacher’s contract, the school district most likely does not 
need to provide notice, summary of charges, or a hearing to the teacher.  
Id. 
 55  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-10 (West 2014): 
No person shall be dismissed or reduced in compensation, (a) if he is or 
shall be under tenure of office, position or employment during good 
behavior and efficiency in the public school system of the state except for 
inefficiency, incapacity, unbecoming conduct, or other just cause, and 
then only after a hearing held pursuant to this subarticle. 
Id. 
 56  Id. 
 57  School Officers and Employees—Improvements—Plans and Specifications, 
2012 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 26 (SENATE 1455) (West). 
 58  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:28-5(a)(3)(b)(1) (West 2014). 
 59  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-123(b)(4) (West 2014). 
 60  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-123(b)(2) (West 2014); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:10-
2.4(b)(1)-(6) (LexisNexis 2015); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:10-4.2(e)(1)-(6) (LexisNexis 
2015).  
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effective, partially effective, and ineffective.61  When a teacher 
receives two consecutive ratings of ineffective, or a rating of partially 
effective followed by ineffective, the superintendent must file tenure 
charges.62  This requirement relieves the superintendent of the 
discretion to decide whether to file charges that she possessed under 
the old law.  In the case of a teacher who receives ratings of 
ineffective followed by partially effective, or partially effective in two 
consecutive years, the superintendent retains that discretionary 
power.63  When faced with a teacher receiving those ratings, the 
superintendent may file charges or may defer by filing written 
evidence of exceptional circumstances.64  Thereafter, the Board may 
file the charges with the Commissioner within thirty days, unless 
the Board decides that the evaluation process was not followed.65 
The Act completely removes the OAL from the tenure hearing 
process.  In its stead, the Act places compulsory, binding 
arbitration.66  Once the Commissioner has the charges, the teacher 
has fifteen days to file a response.67  The Commissioner has ten days 
to submit the charges to an arbitrator.68  A hearing with the 
arbitrator will then take place within forty-five days of the 
assignment of an arbitrator.69  The arbitrator then has forty-five days 
from the start of the hearing to issue a decision.70  The arbitrator 
may consider only the following four issues: (1) if the evaluation 
failed to substantially follow the evaluation process; (2) “if there is 
a mistake of fact in the evaluation;” (3) if the charges were brought 
only as a result of discrimination, nepotism, political affiliation, 
union activity, or other conduct prohibited by federal or state law; 
and (4) if “the district’s actions were arbitrary and capricious.”71  The 
Commissioner may set the arbitrator’s pay, though the Act suggests 
that the arbitrator receive no less than $1250 per day.72  Should the 
Commissioner elect to pay the arbitrator a different amount, the Act 
 
 61  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-123(b)(1) (West 2014). 
 62  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-17.3(a)(1) (West 2014). 
 63  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-17.3(a)(2) (West 2014).  
 64  Id. 
 65  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-17.3(a)(2)(b) (West 2014). 
 66  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-16 (West 2014); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-17.1(e) (West 
2014) (“The arbitrator’s determination shall be final and binding and may not be 
appealable to the commissioner of the State Board of Education.”). 
 67  Id. 
 68  Id. 
 69  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-17.1(b)(1) (West 2015). 
 70  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-17.1(d) (West 2015). 
 71  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-17.2(a)(1)-(4) (West 2014). 
 72  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-17.1(b)(2) (West 2015).  
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requires the Commissioner to consider “the average per diem rate 
of arbitrators eligible to serve on the panel, who reside in New 
Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania.”73  The state bears the cost of 
the arbitration, and the Act no longer caps this expense.74   
The Act received the support of the Democratic legislature, the 
Republican governor, and the state’s major teachers’ union, the New 
Jersey Education Association.75  The legislative and executive 
branches in Trenton had not seen this level of accord at any time 
since Governor Christie’s election.76 
III. EVALUATIONS AND TESTS, DUE PROCESS AND HEARINGS 
A. Teacher Effectiveness and Student Testing 
The TEACHNJ Act compels schools to use teacher evaluations 
that mandate reliance on student test scores.  This requirement 
ignores the primary role socio-economic status plays in student 
achievement, fails to provide specific feedback to teachers about 
instructional practice, and allows teachers to game an easily 
circumvented system.77  Additionally, high stakes tests (such as the 
 
 73  Id.  
 74  Id.  When the TEACHNJ Act was originally passed, the costs of the arbitration 
were capped at $7,500. See School Officers and Employees—Improvements—Plans 
and Specifications, 2012 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 26 (SENATE 1455) (West).  This recent 
change calls into question the likelihood that the Act will reduce the costs of tenure 
proceedings.  See discussion infra Part III.C.ii.  
 75  See Rizzo, supra note 17.  
 76  See, e.g., Todd B. Bates, One Thing N.J. Residents Agree on Is Partisanship, DAILY 
JOURNAL (Jun. 6, 2011), http://archive.thedailyjournal.com/article/20110606/NEW 
S01/106060317/One-thing-N-J-residents-agree-partisanship: 
Last week’s war of words between Republican Gov. Chris Christie and the 
Democrats didn’t move the two sides closer to harmony.  The Democrats 
criticized Christie for using a state police helicopter to fly to his son’s baseball 
game and then to a political dinner.  The governor, in turn, called one 
assemblywoman [sic] a “‘jerk” over the issue and the Democrats said Christie “is 
unable to discuss things like a grown-up.“ 
Id.; Christie Weighs Budget Cuts Amid Spat With ‘S.O.B.’ Democrat, NEWSMAX (Jun. 27, 
2012, 2:54 PM), http://www.newsmax.com/Politics/AMERICAME-BGVTTOP-BNALL-
BNCOPY/2012/06/27/id/443681/:  
Governor Chris Christie called a New Jersey Senate Democrat an 
“arrogant S.O.B.” over the failure to guarantee a tax cut in the 
Legislature’s $31.7 billion spending plan, without saying whether he’ll 
veto it.  Christie’s comment referred to Senator Paul Sarlo, who heads the 
budget panel.  The Republican said he “got fooled” in swapping his 
income-levy rollback for property-tax rebates, citing a six-month delay 
and conditions set by lawmakers. 
Id. 
 77  See ANYA KAMENETZ, THE TEST: WHY OUR SCHOOLS ARE OBSESSED WITH 
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one New Jersey will use, created by the British corporation Pearson 
and known as the Partnership for Assessment of Readiness for 
Colleges and Careers test (PARCC)) are prone to statistical errors 
that make them unsuitable for evaluating teachers.78 
Student test scores do not measure teacher effectiveness.  
According to the Act, up to fifty percent of a teacher’s evaluation 
must reflect student performance on standardized tests.79  Research 
has long settled that the most important factors that influence a 
student’s success as measured by testing are socio-economic, i.e., 
 
STANDARDIZED TESTING—BUT YOU DON’T HAVE TO BE 65 (2015).  Kamenetz explains the 
multiple ways economic struggle affects student achievement as follows: 
Poor kids may not get the same quality sleep because they share a bed or 
sleep on a couch.  They may come to school without breakfast.  Their 
vision goes uncorrected.  They are likely to have less educated parents 
who own fewer books and talk to them less from the time they are 
infants—a gap that’s been estimated at 30 million words by the time they 
start kindergarten.  They are more likely to suffer from “‘toxic stress”‘—a 
parent in jail, abuse, trauma, or risk of homelessness—that interferes 
with their ability to concentrate day to day and can distort their brain 
development over time. 
Id.  Kamanetz goes on to quote the findings of Dr. Michael Freemark, a pediatrics 
professor at Duke University, whose review of state test scores for students in Chapel 
Hill and Raleigh-Durham, North Carolina demonstrated that “‘85 percent of variability 
in school performance is explained by the economic well-being of a child’s family, as 
measured by eligibility for subsidized lunches.’” Id.  See also DIANE RAVITCH, THE DEATH 
AND LIFE OF THE GREAT AMERICAN SCHOOL SYSTEM: HOW TESTING AND CHOICE ARE 
UNDERMINING EDUCATION 258 (rev. and expanded ed., 2010) [hereinafter RAVITCH, 
DEATH AND LIFE] (“Teachers can have a profound influence on their students, but on 
average, what families do or don’t do influences academic outcomes even more.”).  
 78  Diane Ravitch, Schools We Can Envy, THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS (Mar. 8, 
2012), http://www.nybooks.com/ articles/archives/2012/mar/08/schools-we-can-
envy/ (citing DANIEL KORETZ, MEASURING UP: WHAT EDUCATIONAL TESTING REALLY TELLS US 
(2008)).  Professor Ravitch mentions the findings of several researchers in this vein: 
“[E]xperts like Robert L. Linn at the University of Colorado, Linda Darling-Hammond 
at Stanford, and Helen F. Ladd at Duke, as well as a commission of the National 
Research Council, have warned about misuse of standardized tests to hold individual 
teachers accountable with rewards or sanctions.” Id.  The PARCC describes itself as “a 
group of states working together to develop a set of assessments that measure whether 
students are on track to be successful in college and their careers.”  PARTNERSHIP FOR 
ASSESSMENT OF READINESS FOR COLLEGE AND CAREERS, http://parcc.pearson.com/ (last 
visited Mar. 24, 2016).  Despite this characterization, Pearson alone writes the test 
questions, prints, delivers, and scores the exams, and bears responsbility for the security 
of the test’s content.  Kelly Heyboer, PARCC Exams: How Pearson Landed the Deal to 
Produce N.J.’s Biggest Test, NJ.COM (Mar. 22, 2015, 11:17 AM), 
http://www.nj.com/education/2015/03/parcc_exams_how_pearson_landed_the_deal
_to_produce.html. New Jersey expects to pay Pearson up to $108 million over four 
years for this work. Id.   
 79  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-123(b)(4) (West 2014); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:10-
4.1(d)(1)-(4), (e) (LexisNexis 2015).  
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family income, health, and neighborhood characteristics.80  For 
example, a student born to a wealthy family or to educated parents 
will usually outperform peers on standardized tests.81  If a student’s 
family is both wealthy and educated, she is even more certain to 
excel on such assessments.82  To the extent that a teacher’s effect on 
a student’s test score is quantifiable, teaching only accounts for 
between one and fifteen percent of the outcome.83 
In this way, the Act substantially evaluates teachers using a 
metric they do not control.  The result of the Act’s focus on testing 
is a measurement that reflects, for the most part, the student’s socio-
economic status, and not her teachers’ effectiveness.  Since test 
scores have little to do with instructional ability, the half of the Act’s 
new evaluation system that districts may base on them does not 
provide teachers with worthwhile feedback.  Rather, this part of the 
evaluation only suggests to teachers information to which they are 
often already privy, that is, the student’s situation at home. 
In addition to this redundancy, the fifty percent testing 
component of the Act’s teacher evaluation scheme falls short of the 
Act’s goal of “provid[ing] specific feedback.”84  A student’s 
performance on one test on one day, or even on twelve tests on 
twelve days over the course of an entire school year, reveals only a 
snapshot of that student’s performance on those occasions.85  It 
offers no explanation regarding what component of the teacher’s 
practice affected the outcome. 
Teachers may employ several different strategies over the course 
 
 80  See Dana Goldstein, Can Teachers Alone Overcome Poverty? Steven Brill Thinks So, 
THE NATION (Aug. 10, 2011), http://www.thenation.com/article/162695/can-teachers-
alone-overcome-poverty-steven-brill-thinks-so.  See generally Kamenetz, supra note 77; 
RAVITCH, DEATH AND LIFE, supra note 77.  
 81  See Kamenetz, supra note 77; RAVITCH, DEATH AND LIFE, supra note 77, at 286.   
 82  See Kamenetz, supra note 77; RAVITCH, DEATH AND LIFE, supra note 77, at 286: 
Unfortunately, every testing program—be it the SAT, the ACT, NAEP, or 
state scores—shows a tight correlation between family income and scores: 
Children from affluent families have the highest scores, and children from 
poverty have the lowest scores.  On the SAT for reading, students whose 
family income is in the lowest bracket (under $20,000) have an average 
score of 437, while students whose family income is in the highest bracket 
(over $200,000) have a mean score of 568; the gap is as large and as 
regular in mathematics.  The same pattern is found on international 
assessments. 
Id. at 286.  
 83  See AM. STATISTICAL ASS’N, ASA STATEMENT ON USING VALUE-ADDED MODELS FOR 
EDUCATIONAL ASSESSMENT (2014); Goldstein, supra note 80. 
 84  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-118(a) (West 2014). 
 85  See Ravitch, Schools We Can Envy, supra note 78. 
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of a single lesson to help students.  Test scores do not say which 
ones work.  They cannot discern whether it was a teacher’s 
cooperative learning activities or her individual conferencing that 
were effective.  Nor do they address why they were so.  This silence 
of test scores regarding the efficacy of particular instructional 
strategies frustrates the Act’s stated aim to provide specific feedback.  
Rather than providing guidance, test scores leave teachers to guess 
which aspect of their practice works.  For this reason, fully half of 
the Act’s evaluation scheme fails at its stated purpose. 
The above discussion shows that test scores reflect socio-
economic factors more than teacher efficacy, and specify nothing in 
particular regarding teaching strategies.  Of equal significance is the 
indifference of test scores to individual students.86  The possible 
reasons in a student’s life for her success or failure on any given day 
are myriad.  An idiosyncratic love of Gabriel Garcia Marquez’s 
novels, or a sibling’s skilled tutelage in trigonometry might 
contribute to a fine grade on one occasion, just as an unexpected 
family upheaval or a twenty-four hour virus may sabotage the grade 
on another.  Tests ignore the impact of the individual student’s 
emotions, her likes and dislikes, and her personal motivation or lack 
thereof.  These facets of a student’s life profoundly influence her 
ability to learn.87  However, half of the Act’s evaluation scheme relies 
on a measurement that is unable to account for such concerns, while 
at the same time being, in part, encumbered by them.  Just as 
teachers cannot control the socio-economic status of a student, they 
cannot alleviate a student’s personal difficulties.  Even so, the Act’s 
testing mandate rates teachers as if a student’s personal obstacles do 
not exist.  The Act has created a teacher evaluation regime based on 
 
 86  See RAVITCH, DEATH AND LIFE, supra note 77, at 162-63.  Professor Ravitch 
discusses the problem of student responsibility and test scores, along with that of 
family responsibility and test scores, with specific reference to testing under the No 
Child Left Behind Act (“NCLB”):  
One problem with test-based accountability, as currently defined and 
used, is that it removes all responsibility from students and their families 
for the students’ academic performance.  NCLB neglected to 
acknowledge that students share in the responsibility for their academic 
performance and that they are not merely passive recipients of their 
teachers’ influence.  Nowhere in the federal accountability scheme are 
there measures or indicators of students’ diligence, effort, and 
motivation.  Do they attend school regularly?  Do they do their 
homework?  Do they pay attention in class?  Are they motivated to 
succeed?  These factors affect their school performance as much as or 
more than their teachers’ skill. 
Id. 
 87  Id. 
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student performance that ignores the agency of the student.  
Teachers’ evaluations should not be subject to the accidents of 
students’ lives. 
B. TEACHNJ and Cheating 
Since teachers lack the ability to improve the most essential 
components of a student’s test-taking ability (i.e., her socio-
economic status and her personal motivation), and because under 
the Act that ability constitutes half of teachers’ evaluations, teachers 
may find other ways to survive this threat.  In short, high-stakes 
testing often leads to widespread cheating by teachers and 
administrators.88  Major district-wide cheating scandals have come 
to light in Georgia, Nevada, and Washington D.C.89  In each case, 
 
 88  See GOLDSTEIN, THE TEACHER WARS, supra note 26, at 227.  Goldstein lists several 
disturbing findings regarding the relationship between high-stakes testing and 
cheating:   
Increasingly, there was evidence that a significant number of 
unscrupulous administrators and teachers nationwide had responded to 
the higher stakes attached to state-level standardized tests—evaluations, 
bonus pay, and public release of data—by cheating.  [Jack Gilum and 
Marisol Bello of USA Today] studied six. . .states and found over sixteen 
hundred examples of probable test score manipulation between 2002 
and 2010.  (The newspaper would have almost certainly found even 
more cheating had it not zeroed in on only the most suspicious test score 
leaps.  For example: At one Gainesville, Florida, elementary school, math 
proficiency rates jumped from 5 percent to 91 percent in three years.)  A 
subsequent investigation by the Atlanta Journal-Constitution discovered 
196 school districts across the country with suspicious test score gains. 
Id.  See also RAVITCH, REIGN OF ERROR, supra note 14, at 148-150 (discussing Washington 
D.C.’s former superintendent, Michelle Rhee, and the “major cheating scandal” caused 
by Rhee’s “relentless pressure to raise the passing rates on tests”). 
 89  See Michelle Rindels, 3 School Staffers On Leave In Vegas Cheating Probe, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 17, 2014, 10:55 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014 
/04/17/clark-county-cheatingteachers_n_5166780.html; RAVITCH, REIGN OF ERROR, 
supra note 14, at 148-150; Alan Blinder, Atlanta Educators Convicted in School Cheating 
Scandal, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/02/us/verdict-
reached-in-atlanta-school-testing-trial.html?_r=0 (discussing a state investigation that 
concluded “that cheating had occurred in at least 44 schools and that the district had 
been troubled by ‘organized and systemic misconduct,’” and resulted in the conviction 
of eleven public school educators on charges of racketeering).  The presiding judge, 
Judge Jerry W. Baxter of Fulton County Superior Court, ordered most of the teachers 
and administrators jailed immediately, and took the opportunity to scold them thus: 
“I don’t like to send anybody to jail . . . . But they have made their bed, and they’re 
going to have to lie in it, and it starts today.”  Id.  Atlanta Superintendent Beverly L. 
Hall had been charged as well, but she died before she could stand trial.  Id.  Prior to 
coming to the Atlanta public schools in 1999, Dr. Hall, who investigators said “created 
a culture of fear, intimidation and retaliation” that allowed “cheating—at all levels—
to go unchecked for years,” was the superintendent of the public schools in Newark, 
New Jersey.  See John Mooney, DOE Releases Two More Reports on School Cheating 
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the district tied the evaluation of teachers to the performance of 
students on tests.90  These states put teachers in an untenable 
situation: their ability to pursue a calling was subordinated to the 
socio-economic and emotional conditions of their students.  Faced 
with these grim odds, teachers and administrators aided students in 
a variety of unethical ways to keep their own jobs.91 
The TEACHNJ Act penalizes teachers for student test 
performance in ways similar to the testing regimes in Georgia, 
Nevada, and Washington D.C.  This correspondence augurs 
corresponding results for New Jersey.  Teachers faced with the 
possibility of losing their livelihoods may act to protect themselves 
by resorting to cheating. 
One aspect of the design of the TEACHNJ Act makes it rather 
easy for teachers to manipulate their evaluations.  Under the Act, 
teachers’ evaluations involve SGOs.92  These instruments allow 
teachers, in consultation with administrators, to determine which 
students must improve, how much they must improve, and on what 
assessments they must improve.93  Teachers may set different goals 
 
Scandal, NJ SPOTLIGHT (Apr. 8, 2013), http:// www.njspotlight.com/stories/13/ 
04/07/doe-releases-two-more-reports-on-school-cheating-scandal/. 
 90  See Stephanie Banchero, Nearly Half of States Link Teacher Evaluations to Tests, 
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 26, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240529702039118 
04576653542137785186; RAVITCH, REIGN OF ERROR, supra note 14, at 148-150; Blinder, 
supra note 89. 
 91  New Jersey has already experienced cheating scandals under the previous testing 
regime. See Vernal Coleman, Woodbridge School Principal Encouraged Cheating on 
Standardized Test, State Says, NJ.COM (Mar. 20, 2015), http://www.nj.com/middlesex 
/index.ssf/2015/03/woodbridge_district_elementary_school_principal_ch.html: 
[The Office of Fiscal Accountability and Compliance’s] investigation 
alleges that during the 2010 and 2011 NJ ASK examinations, 
[Woodbridge elementary school principal Cathie] Bedosky encouraged 
test examiners and proctors to interfere with the independent work of 
students taking the assessment, failed to properly train examiners and 
utilized unqualified staff to fulfill test examiner positions . . . . Previous 
investigations by DOE Office of Fiscal Accountability and Compliance 
have implicated other township elementary teachers in testing scandals.  
In 2012, five Woodbridge administrators [two elementary school 
principals and three teachers] were accused by state investigators of 
cheating, or encouraging students to cheat on state standardized tests. 
Id.  Mooney, supra note 89 (discussing reports from the New Jersey Department of 
Education finding that in two East Orange elementary schools “several teachers either 
breached proper security protocols or may have coached students to change answers”). 
 92  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-123(b)(2)-(3) (West 2014); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:10-
2.4(b)(1)-(6) (LexisNexis 2015); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:10-4.2(e)(1)-(6) (LexisNexis 
2015).   
 93  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-123(b)(2)-(6) (West 2014); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:10-
2.4(b)(1)-(6) (LexisNexis 2015); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:10-4.2(e)(1)-(6) (LexisNexis 
2015). 
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for different students based on various and multiple starting 
points.94  For instance, an SGO might state that eighty percent of 
students who turned in seventy-five percent of the homework 
assignments will reach the targeted score on a particular test.  If, for 
example, only forty percent of the entire class hands in seventy-five 
percent of the homework assignments, the teacher has just excluded 
more than half the class from the equation.  This SGO has shielded 
the teacher from her scores because the part of the class that does 
not turn in enough homework is also likely to be the students in 
need of the greatest assistance on tests. 
In the 2014-15 school year, teacher-created SGOs will account 
for twenty percent of teachers’ evaluations.95  Given the draconian 
penalty of tenure removal for unsatisfactory test scores, teachers 
have a strong incentive to rig this part of the Act’s evaluation method 
to their advantage. 
C. Tenure Proceedings 
As part of its scheme to reduce teachers’ job protections, the Act 
removed tenure hearings from the OAL and placed them in the 
hands of appointed arbitrators.96  This reduction in tenure 
protections does not address the Act’s stated goal of increasing 
student achievement through better instruction.  In addition, the 
new plan subjects the tenure hearing process to undue political 
influence.  The Act’s method for the appointment of the 
Commissioner’s panel of arbitrators hearing tenure charges creates 
a patronage system that allows interested parties to adjudicate 
tenure proceedings, as long as they do so according to the wishes of 
their benefactors. 
i. Dismissal, Property Rights, and Interested Arbitrators 
In its stated attempt to increase the success of students through 
better instruction, TEACHNJ’s new evaluation and removal 
procedures make it easier to dismiss teachers.  However, there is no 
evidence that reducing tenure protections leads to better instruction 
or improved student achievement.97  States and districts that have 
 
 94  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-123(b)(2)-(6) (West 2014); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:10-
2.4(b)(1)-(6) (LexisNexis 2015); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:10-4.2(e)(1)-(6) (LexisNexis 
2015).   
 95  New Jersey Department of Education, Student Growth Objectives: Developing and 
Using Practical Measures of Student Learning, 3 (2014). 
 96  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-16 (West 2014); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-17.1(a) (West 
2014). 
 97  RAVITCH, REIGN OF ERROR, supra note 14, at 129. 
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previously made similar changes to their tenure rules have not seen 
significant increases in student test scores.98  Moreover, there is no 
guarantee that qualified replacements will be available to replace 
dismissed teachers.99  In fact, firing teachers for inefficacy makes 
recruiting new teachers more difficult.100  So, the greater ease with 
which districts can lay off teachers under TEACHNJ will not solve 
the problems its proponents claim exist.  These measures may even 
cause other problems. 
The new removal procedures are not only likely to be ineffective 
as far as improving instruction goes.  By empowering interested 
parties to hear tenure cases, they also corrupt the independence, and 
therefore the legitimacy, of the proceedings overall.  The New Jersey 
School Boards Association (“NJSBA”) and the New Jersey Principals 
and Supervisors Association (“NJPSA”) will appoint twenty-eight of 
the fifty arbitrators on the panel.101  The state’s two teachers unions, 
the NJEA and the American Federation of Teachers (“AFT”), will 
appoint the remaining twenty-two arbitrators.102  Therefore, most of 
the arbitrators deciding tenure charges will owe their appointments 
to organizations whose members file and certify tenure charges, i.e., 
school boards and administrators.103  Just as dangerous for 
 
 98  Howard Blume, Schools’ Next Test is Getting Tenure Ruling to Pay Off in Class, L.A. 
TIMES (June 11, 2014, 10:08 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/education/la-me-
teacher-decision-lawsuit-20140612-story.html (quoting Jesse Rothstein, associate 
professor of public policy at the University of California, Berkeley, noting that 
regarding states’ tenure reform measures, “There’s no evidence yet that these changes 
have had a beneficial effect”). 
 99  Ray Fisman, How To Build a Better Teacher, SLATE (Oct. 20, 2014, 9:37 AM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/business/the_dismal_science/2012/07/how_to_improv
e_teaching_new_evidence_that_poor_teachers_can_learn_to_be_good_ones_.html; 
GOLDSTEIN, THE TEACHER WARS, supra note 26, at 230: 
Even if test scores were a flawless reflection of student learning and 
teacher quality, there is no evidence that the new teachers who replace 
the bad teachers will be any better—it is practically impossible to predict, 
via demographic traits, test scores, grades, or pathway into the 
profession, who will become an effective teacher. 
 100  Jesse Rothstein, Taking On Teacher Tenure Backfires, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/13/opinion/california-ruling-on-teacher-tenure-is-
not-whole-picture.html?_r=0 (“[F]iring bad teachers actually makes it harder to recruit 
new good ones, since new teachers don’t know which type they will be.”). 
 101  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-17.1(a) (West 2015) (“[Eighteen]. . . arbitrators shall be 
designated by the New Jersey School Boards Association, and 10 arbitrators shall be 
designated by the New Jersey Principals and Supervisors Association.”). 
 102  Id. 
 103  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-17.3(a)(1) (West 2014); N.J. STAT. ANN § 18A:6-11 (West 
2014).  The names of the arbitrators and which organizations appointed them are 
difficult to find.  David Saenz Jr., Deputy Press Secretary at the New Jersey Department 
of Education, provided the following information.  The NJPSA-designated arbitrators 
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impartiality is the prospect of arbitrators with deep ties to the 
unions who appointed them to hear tenure charges. 
The Act’s delegation of the authority to appoint the officials 
responsible for tenure adjudication to interested private 
organizations fails to satisfy the requirements of procedural due 
process.  This appointment method, along with the lack of an 
explicit dismissal mechanism, vitiates the impartiality necessary to 
make tenure proceedings constitutionally sound.  The OAL’s 
appointment and dismissal procedure for ALJs, on the other hand, 
demonstrates proper regard to procedural due process standards. 
Teachers, in New Jersey and elsewhere, have procedural due 
process rights with regard to tenure.  Procedural due process rights 
attach when (1) the government acts, (2) against an individual, (3) 
to deprive her of life, liberty, or property.104  Tenure removal meets 
the first two elements because the government acts through its 
agents (a superintendent and a board of education) to initiate the 
process against a particular teacher.  The third element is met 
because the Supreme Court has said that teachers have a property 
right in tenure.105 
Teachers’ property rights in tenure originate in Board of Regents 
v. Roth.  In that case, the Supreme Court stated that “[t]o have a 
property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than 
an abstract need or desire for it.  He must have more than a 
unilateral expectation of it.  He must, instead, have a legitimate 
claim of entitlement to it.”106  The Court clarified that the 
 
are Lewis R. Amis, Stephen M. Bluth, Daniel F. Brent, Thomas J. DiLauro, Jacquelin F. 
Drucker, Edmund G. Gerber, Gary T. Kendellen, Joseph Licata, Earl R. Pfeffer, and 
Ernest Weiss.  The NJSBA-designated arbitrators are Peter Adomeit, Scott E. Buchheit, 
Dennis J. Campagna, Walter H. DeTreux, Mattye M. Gandel, Robert C. Gifford, Jay D. 
Goldstein, David L. Gregory, Randi E. Lowitt, Andree Y. McKissick, Arthur A. Riegel, 
Stephen J. Rosen, John E. Sands, Mariann E. Schick, Joel M. Weisblatt, and Perry Alan 
Zirkel.  The NJEA-designated arbitrators are Michael A. Berzansky, Melissa H. Biren, 
Ralph H. Colflesh, Howard C. Edelman, Deborah M. Gaines, Thomas D. Hartigan, 
Carol F. Laskin, James W. Mastriani, Ruth M. Moscovitch, Susan Wood Osborn, 
Michael J. Pecklers, Gerard G. Restaino, Tia Schneider Denenberg, Robert T. 
Simmelkjaer, and Barbara Zausner.  The AFT-designated arbitrator is Timothy J. Brown. 
The Commissioner appointed Joyce M. Klein and Alan A. Symonette.  E-mail from 
David Saenz, Jr., Deputy Press Secretary, New Jersey Department of Education, to 
Author (Mar. 28, 2016, 8:20 PM) (on file with author). 
 104  U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 
257 (1970) (extending constitutional safeguards in the form of administrative hearing 
rights to welfare recipients prior to termination of benefits due to ineligibility by a 
government welfare agency).   
 105  Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 
593 (1972).  
 106  Roth, 408 U.S. at 577. 
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Constitution does not create property interests, “[r]ather, they are 
created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or 
understandings that stem from an independent source such as state 
law—rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that 
support claims of entitlement to those benefits.”107 
The Court held that the teacher in Roth had no property interest 
entitling him to due process rights under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, because he had been hired using a series of one-year 
contracts.108  By contrast, New Jersey’s tenured teachers have the 
proper independent source of state law that secures their tenure 
benefits and their entitlement to them.109  Therefore, they must 
receive due process when the State seeks to deprive them of tenure. 
Procedural due process protections require that an impartial 
authority carry out adjudications.110  The TEACHNJ Act’s new 
scheme for adjudication undermines impartiality by allowing the 
appointment of biased arbitrators.  Arbitrators are chosen by the 
most interested parties in tenure hearings: school boards (the 
NJSBA), administrators (the NJPSA), and teachers (the NJEA and the 
AFT).111 
Each one of these organizations has the responsibility to 
represent its constituents.  To do so, they will appoint arbitrators 
 
 107  Id. at 572. 
 108  Id. at 579. See also Perry, 408 U.S. at 602 (holding that a teacher in the Texas 
state college system was entitled to a hearing and notice of grounds for his non-renewal 
if the college had a de facto tenure system and the teacher was entitled to tenure under 
it). 
 109  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:28-1 et seq. (West 2014); Spiewak v. Board of Education, 
447 A.2d 140, 144 (1982) (holding that N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18A:28-1 to 18A:28-18 make 
tenure a mandatory term and condition of employment that supersedes contractual 
terms).   
 110  See Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the 
Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L. J. 455, 476 (1986) (“None of the core values 
of due process, however, can be fulfilled without the participation of an independent 
adjudicator.”); Judith K. Meierhenry, The Due Process Right to an Unbiased Adjudicator in 
Administrative Proceedings, 36 S.D. L. R. 551, 554 (1991): 
Whether legislative or court mandated, most procedural due process 
rights give a party an opportunity to present the evidence and require 
notice, a hearing, representation by counsel, transcription, cross-
examination, and testimony.  The procedural safeguards may appear to 
insure [sic] due process rights; however, if the decisionmaker has 
prejudged the matter or relies on evidence other than that presented at 
the hearing, the procedural safeguards become immaterial.  An 
independent and unbiased adjudicator is such an essential element of 
accurate decisionmaking that without it there may never be due process.  
Id. 
 111  N.J. STAT. ANN. §18A:6-17.1(a) (West 2014). 
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sympathetic to the interests of their members.  By the time the 
tenure removal process makes it to an arbitrator, members of both 
the NJSBA and the NJPSA have recorded their support for 
removal.112  It follows that the NJSBA and the NJPSA will appoint 
arbitrators who are likely to support the decisions of its members to 
strip teachers of tenure.  In the same fashion, NJEA and AFT will 
both appoint and maintain arbitrators who have demonstrated 
fealty to their own ranks.  While, it is possible that some teachers 
may present their cases before arbitrators who are biased in their 
favor, nevertheless, given the appointment breakdown, it is more 
probable that teachers will stand before an authority who owes her 
power to the representative of the other side of the proceeding, that 
is, the NJSBA or the NJPSA.  The existence of this direct connection 
between the adjudicator and one side of the dispute renders 
impartiality unlikely. 
Moreover, the Act’s reticence on the removal process for 
arbitrators suggests an even greater problem for the impartial 
authority obligation.  The Act provides only that the Commissioner 
may remove an arbitrator if she fails to meet the time constraints for 
the proceedings without asking for an extension.113  The Act explains 
how arbitrators are hired, but not how they are fired.  If the 
Commissioner cannot do it, who can?  Both the Act and the 
regulations are silent on this important issue.  The answer may be 
that the organizations that appoint are also the organizations that 
remove.  In that case, school boards and administrators, as well as 
teachers, could dismiss arbitrators who do not rule as they see fit.  
This scenario forecloses the possibility of disinterested adjudication. 
ii. Time and Costs 
The TEACHNJ Act’s removal of tenure proceedings from the 
OAL in favor of binding arbitration might not solve the problems 
of time and cost efficiency.  The findings of New Jersey’s non-
partisan Office of Legislative Services (“OLS”) show that one of the 
major claims reformers make to support the need for the Act’s 
gutting of tenure protections—that removal costs hundreds of 
thousands of dollars—is not adequately addressed by the Act.  As to 
the claim that firing a tenured teacher takes too long, the Act’s 
provisions may not prevent lengthy proceedings. 
With regard to expense, the OLS stated that it is possible that 
 
 112  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-17.3(a)(2), (b) (West 2014). 
 113  See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-17.1 (West 2014) (providing the method for 
arbitrator designation without any discussion of removal).  
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costs associated with tenure charges will rise as a result of an 
expected increase in the number of such cases.114  The OLS also 
reported that the new evaluation system used to facilitate the firing 
of tenured teachers will cost the state more than 52 million dollars 
to implement, while noting that this number does not include other 
costs of implementation likely to be borne by both the state and 
local school districts.115 
It is also not clear that the new scheme will make tenure 
proceedings go faster.  The Act allows for extensions at the request 
of the arbitrator.116  No restrictions exist regarding the number of 
extensions that the Commissioner may grant.  Furthermore, the Act 
provides that the arbitrator’s decision must be granted within forty-
five days of the start of the proceedings.117  No language in the Act 
defines the “start” of the proceedings (do they begin when the 
parties first discuss dates to appear before the arbitrator, when the 
parties actually appear before the arbitrator, when testimony is 
taken, or at some other point?).  Whatever the speed of that 
component of the process, judicial review of an arbitrator’s decision 
remains available.118  In this way, the arbitrator’s decision lacks 
finality, so the proceedings may continue. 
At the least, there is uncertainty as to the ability of the Act to 
curb the purported inefficiencies of the prior scheme. 
IV. THE NEW JERSEY OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE CENTRAL 
PANEL SOLUTION TO TEACHNJ 
New Jersey’s OAL provides the best forum to adjudicate tenure 
proceedings.  The OAL’s organization as a central panel allows for 
judicial independence while inspiring public confidence.119  Its ALJs 
have clear appointment and dismissal procedures in place, thus 
avoiding the due process and impartiality issues created by the 
TEACHNJ Act.120   
 
 114  STATE OF N.J. OFFICE OF LEGIS. SERVS., LEGIS. FISCAL ESTIMATE, S. 1455, 215th Legis. 
(2012).  
 115  Id.  The report estimated the cost of implementing the new evaluation scheme 
for principals would be 11.9 million dollars.  Id. 
 116  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-17.1(g) (West 2014).  
 117  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-17.1(d) (West 2014). 
 118  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-17.1(e) (West 2014); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:24-7 (West 
2014); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:24-10 (West 2014). 
 119  See STATE OF N.J. OFFICE OF ADMIN. LAW, ABOUT THE OFFICE OF ADMIN. LAW, 
http://www.state.nj.us/oal/about/about/ (last visited May 4, 2015). 
 120  N. J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14f-4 (West 2014); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14f-5(s) (West 
2014).   
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A. The Central Panel 
In twenty-four states and the federal system, administrative law 
cases are handled by a department within the agency that will also 
be one of the litigants in those controversies.121  The agency staffs 
this department with its own administrative law judges.122  These 
ALJs hear and decide contested cases (though their decisions are 
usually subject to review by the Commissioner).123  States attempt 
to ensure the independence of these agency ALJs by implementing 
various protections, usually concerning salary and removal.  At the 
federal level, the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) guards that 
independence in part by taking the hiring and firing of 
administrative law judges completely away from the agencies.124  
Two separate agencies, the Office of Personnel Management and the 
Merit Systems Protection Board, handle these tasks.125 
By contrast, New Jersey, along with twenty-five other states as 
well as the cities of Chicago, New York City, and the District of 
Columbia, has established stronger protection for judicial 
 
 121  See Ann Wise, Louisiana’s Division of Administrative Law: An Independent 
Administrative Hearings Tribunal, 30 J. NAT’L ASS’N L. JUD. 95, 95-96 (2010) (stating that 
“The ‘central panel’ movement has been strong, and more than half the states have 
adopted some form of quasi-judicial tribunal,” and listing the following twenty-six 
states: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, 
Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Minnesota, New 
Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, 
Tennessee, Texas, Washington, Wisonconsin, Wyoming); Administrative Procedure Act 
§ 1, 5 U.S.C.A. § 3105 (West 2015) (“Each agency shall appoint as many administrative 
law judges as are necessary for proceedings required to be conducted in accordance 
with sections 556 and 557 of this title.”).   
 122  5 U.S.C.A. § 3105 (West 2015).  Cf. JERRY L. MASHAW, RICHARD A. MERRILL, & PETER 
M. SHANE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM 463 (6th ed. 2009): 
Almost every Congress sees the reintroduction of legislation proposing 
to remove all ALJs from line agencies and establish them as a separate, 
independent corps of administrative law judges . . . .  [The location of 
ALJs within agencies] is not only controversial, it is a unique compromise 
between adjudicatory independence and managerial responsibility born 
of the peculiar history of administrative governance in the United States.   
Id. 
 123  DANIEL J. GIFFORD, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 9 (2d ed. 2010).  
 124  5 U.S.C.A. § 5372 (West 2015); 5 U.S.C.A. § 7521 (West 2015). 
 125  5 U.S.C.A. § 5362 (West 2015); 5 U.S.C.A. § 7521(a) (West 2015).  Removal of 
federal ALJs under the APA not only involves a separate agency, it also requires good 
cause, a determination on the record, and a hearing:   
An action may be taken against an administrative law judge appointed 
under Section 3105 of this title by the agency in which the administrative 
law judge is employed only for good cause established and determined 
by the Merit Systems Protection Board on the record after opportunity 
for hearing before the Board. 
Id. 
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impartiality in administrative proceedings.126  All of these states and 
cities have created a free-standing central panel.127   
A central panel is an independent office of administrative 
law.128  It has a cadre of ALJs who adjudicate contested cases 
involving other agencies within the central panel’s jurisdiction.129  
The purpose of the central panel is to provide both the public and 
the agencies due process and fair adjudications.130  For example, if 
the state environmental protection agency and a developer have a 
dispute, it will be heard by an ALJ in the central panel, rather than 
by one of the agency’s own employees.  The separation of both sides 
from the adjudicator promotes facial and substantive fairness.131  
Some central panels have seen their legislatures increase their 
jurisdiction over time.132  Executive action, rather than legislation, 
 
 126  See Wise, supra note 121; A. Michael Nolan, State Agency-Based v. Central Panel 
Jurisdictions: Is There a Deference, 29 NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUD. 1, 23 n. 69 (2009) (“In 
addition, three cities have developed central panel hearing agencies: Chicago, Illinois, 
the District of Columbia, and New York, New York.”); Larry J. Craddock, Final Decision 
Authority and the Central Panel ALJ, 33 NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUD. 471, 476-77 (2013): 
The central panel’s main role is to provide fair adjudications and due 
process to both the litigating agencies and the public.  The central panel 
ALJ is independent of, and not subject to control or influence by, the 
agencies for which the ALJ conducts hearings.  Instead, the ALJ reports to 
a chief ALJ or central panel director. 
Id. 
 127  See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1092.01 (2016) (establishing an office of 
administrative hearings); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-30-1001 (2015) (creating the office of 
administrative courts in the personnel department); GA. CODE ANN. § 50-13-40 (2015) 
(creating the Office of State Administrative Hearings within the executive branch of the 
state government); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14f-4 (West 2014) (establishing the Office of 
Administrative Law); N.D. Cent. Code § 54-57-01 (2015) (creating a state office of 
administrative hearings). 
 128  Craddock, supra note 126, at 476-78.  See also L. Harold Levinson, The Central 
Panel System: A Framework that Separates ALJs from Administrative Agencies, 65 JUDICATURE 
236, 236 (1981); Julian Mann III, Striving for Efficiency in Administrative Litigation: North 
Carolina’s Office of Administrative Hearings, 15 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 151, 155 
(1995) (referring to the central panel as an “autonomous, quasi-judicial, executive 
branch agency”).   
 129  Craddock, supra note 126, at 476. 
 130  Craddock, supra note 126, at 476-77. 
 131  Levinson, supra note 128, at 245 (“While adoption of a central panel system 
does not guarantee the independence of the ALJ from the agency, the central panel is 
likely to be accompanied by greater independence.  Perhaps more importantly, the 
central panel system is generally perceived as a significant step toward ALJ 
independence.”); Craddock, supra note 126, at 476-77; Hon. Edwin L. Felter, Jr., Special 
Problems of State Administrative Law Judges, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 403, 405 (“The central 
panel structure, especially the free-standing central panel, is the preferred structure 
from a standpoint of adjudicatory professionalism, public confidence, and 
judicial/decisional independence of the ALJs.”). 
 132  James F. Flanagan, An Update on Developments in Central Panels and ALJ Final 
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has also increased the jurisdiction of central panels.133 
Central panels support adjudicatory proficiency, decisional 
independence, and public trust.134  They are also more efficient and 
less costly than their intra-agency counterparts.135  Most importantly 
for this Note, the central panel structure is free of the due process 
and impartiality concerns created by TEACHNJ’s arbitrator 
appointment method.  The way that ALJs are appointed to New 
Jersey’s OAL demonstrates this crucial difference. 
B. New Jersey’s Administrative Law Judges 
The appointment and removal of ALJs to New Jersey’s central 
OAL suffer from none of the due process shortcomings of the 
arbitrator selections instituted by the TEACHNJ Act.  Unlike that Act, 
New Jersey law openly explains the procedure for hiring ALJs.  The 
OAL’s statutorily created method for these appointments and 
removals is transparent and subject to democratic controls.  For 
these reasons, New Jersey should return to using the OAL for tenure 
proceedings. 
The appointment of ALJs involves both the executive and the 
legislature.136  With the advice and consent of the Senate, the 
governor appoints the ALJ.137  The ALJ’s term is set.138  Her initial 
employment is for one year, after which the ALJ may be reappointed 
by the governor to a four-year term.139  Following this period, the 
governor, again with the advice and consent of the Senate, may 
reappoint the ALJ to terms of five years.140 
The mechanisms for disciplining and removing ALJs are clear 
and independent.141  The Director and Chief Administrative Law 
Judge (“the Director”), who is also appointed by the governor with 
the advice and consent of the Senate, evaluates ALJs focusing on 
three areas of their performance as judges: competence, 
productivity, and demeanor.142  The law commands the Director to 
 
Order Authority, 38 IND. L. REV. 401, 405 (2005).  
 133  Id. 
 134  Felter, supra note 131, at 403. 
 135  Flanagan, supra note 132, at 405. 
 136  N. J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14f-4 (West 2014). 
 137  Id.  
 138  Id.  
 139  Id.  
 140  Id.   
 141  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14f-5(s) (West 2014).  
 142  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14f-3 (West 2014); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14f-5(s) (West 
2014). 
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consider several aspects of those parts of an ALJ’s work, including 
impartiality.143  Notably, the methods the ALJ uses in arriving at her 
decisions may be used in her evaluation, but not the results of those 
methods.144 
The differences between the methods of appointment at the 
OAL and in the TEACHNJ Act could not be more pronounced.  ALJs 
in the central panel are appointed in an open public forum.  
TEACHNJ’s arbitrators are picked behind closed doors.  The OAL’s 
ALJs are appointed by politically accountable people—the Senate 
and the governor.  TEACHNJ’s arbitrators are backed by 
organizations that the public cannot join, lobby, or change.  Under 
the OAL’s method, an open procedure by two politically 
accountable branches of the government repeats for each ALJ after 
the first year, and then again after four years, and every five years 
thereafter.  In this way, an ALJ’s appointment is subject to 
predictable and regular democratic control.  There is no democratic 
control of any kind built into the TEACHNJ Act of the school 
boards’, the administrators’, and the unions’ arbitrators. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The TEACHNJ Act’s attack on tenure does not solve the issues 
attributed to tenure as it existed prior to the Act’s passage.  The Act 
imposes testing to evaluate teachers, despite testing’s inability to do 
so effectively, and in the face of voluminous evidence denouncing 
the practice.  The Act’s evaluation scheme ignores the socio-
economic conditions and the diligence of the students it tests.  The 
Act’s harsh punishments for lagging test scores push teachers and 
administrators to cheat.  Moreover, the Act infringes on 
constitutionally protected procedural standards by allowing the 
parties involved in tenure proceedings to choose their own 
adjudicators. 
To ensure fair and effective process for teachers, tenure 
proceedings must be restored to the Office of Administrative Law, 
examined independently of student achievement considerations, 
and changed only insofar as such changes comport with the goals 
of that office. 
 
 
 143  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14f-5(s) (West 2014) (Other considerations the Director 
must take into account include legal skills and knowledge of the law and new legal 
developments, analytical talents and writing abilities, settlement skills, and 
conscientiousness).   
 144  N. J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14f-5(s) (West 2014).  
